Colombia joins Latin America’s rightward political swing with right-wing outsider de la Espriella’s election win

Event

Right-wing outsider Abelardo de la Espriella won a historically close presidential run-off on 21 June, defeating his leftist rival, Iván Cepeda. Turnout reached its highest level since the run-off system was introduced in 1994 and, combined with a razor-thin margin of less than 1%, underscored the deep polarisation in the country. Despite having agreed to stand down, incumbent leftist President Gustavo Petro continues to cast doubt on the results, alleging irregularities without evidence. As a result, Petro and de la Espriella have clashed publicly, most recently over the presidential transition process. Nevertheless, de la Espriella is expected to take office on 7 August.

Impact

In little more than a year, seven Latin American countries have held presidential elections and right-wing candidates have won them all. As elsewhere in the region, concerns about rising gang violence proved highly salient during the election campaign. Hence, security is set to become the key priority of the new administration, which has pledged a more forceful approach to organised crime and drug trafficking than the outgoing Petro government. De la Espriella has repeatedly cited Bukele’s security strategy in El Salvador as a reference point. This strategy transformed one of the world’s most violent countries into one of the safest in Central America, albeit at a significant institutional and democratic cost. Replicating that success in Colombia, however, will be considerably more challenging. Colombia is more than fifty times larger than El Salvador, eight times more populous, accounts for roughly two-thirds of global cocaine production and faces criminal organisations deeply embedded in transnational networks rather than largely domestic gangs.

Economically, de la Espriella advocates a liberal shock programme centred on deregulation and a stronger role for the private sector. His proposals include preserving central bank independence, reducing the size of the state by 40%, implementing pro-business tax reforms and pursuing fiscal consolidation. He has also pledged to restart oil exploration and expand hydrocarbon production, including through fracking. These proposals would mark a sharp departure from the policies of the Petro administration (2022–2026), which was characterised by greater state involvement in the economy, restrictions on new hydrocarbon exploration and a deterioration in fiscal policy credibility.

Yet translating these ambitions into policy will not be straightforward. Congress remains highly fragmented and is likely to constrain the government’s ability to pursue far-reaching reforms. Adding to these challenges, de la Espriella’s own political party controls only a handful of seats in Congress, less than 2% of the total, making coalition-building essential to advance his legislative agenda. Moreover, de la Espriella secured the narrowest presidential victory in Colombia’s modern history in percentage-point terms, leaving him with a relatively weak mandate. His plans for fiscal consolidation and public debt reduction, with public debt standing at around 60% of GDP at end-2025, will also face competing pressures from higher security spending, healthcare demands and proposed corporate tax cuts aimed at stimulating private investment. Furthermore, Colombia’s fiscal adjustment is constrained by a constitutional fiscal framework and a highly rigid expenditure structure, limiting the scope for rapid fiscal deficit reduction, estimated at -5.2% of GDP in 2026.

The most consequential near-term impact of de la Espriella’s victory may ultimately be geopolitical. Relations with neighbouring Ecuador are already showing signs of improvement. A first indication came in June, when President Daniel Noboa agreed to end the trade war with Colombia following a conversation with de la Espriella. Relations with the USA are also likely to strengthen significantly. Petro and Trump clashed repeatedly during the former’s presidency, leading to periods of diplomatic tension and short-lived tariff threats. By contrast, de la Espriella received Trump’s endorsement during the election campaign and has pledged to align Colombia’s security strategy more closely with the US agenda, including participation in a regional ‘Shield of the Americas’ security initiative.

Colombia’s short-term political risk classification remains in category 3/7, with a stable outlook, given its adequate level of foreign exchange reserves at about six months of import cover in January 2026 and moderate short-term external debt. The country’s medium- to long-term political risk rating is in category 5/7, with a stable outlook as well. This elevated risk rating is mainly explained by the country’s elevated external debt-to-current account revenues ratio and elevated external debt service-to-current account revenues ratio.

Analyst: Jolyn Debuysscher – J.Debuysscher@credendo.com